Heidegger :: Heidegger connaissait parfaitement les mystiques germaniques et a construit son grand oeuvre (notamment Sein und Zeit) sur eux. C'est bien le problème : un philosophe ne peut être un mystique, et réciproquement. C'est l'hésitation qui, tout en permettant à la philosophie de plus en plus scientiste de buter à nouveau sur "l'ipséologie", discours propre des mystiques, a limité la portée de l'élan heideggerien. Certes Heidegger a approché la posture mystique, notamment dans son style poétique. Mais le style ne suffit pas au "liegenlassen" (à l'abandon de soi au présent) propre au mystique. Cette hésitation lui a aussi interdit la voie de la "techouva", le retour du mystique parmi les hommes, et a conditionné probablement le maintien de ce "retrait" et de cet amour du terroir, cause d'ambiguités morales et politiques chez le philosophe.
Par la suite, cette ambiguité n'a pas permis à ses émules de trouver (ou de récuser franchement) la voie mystique qui n'est jamais explication ou bavardage sur (ce que dit d'ailleurs Heidegger... en bavardant sur...), mais dynamique du sujet dans l'acte performatif d'étendre la vie jusqu'aux confins de la mort (ce qui est le contraire du slogan nazi du "vive la mort").
Historial Culture :: Men do not only content themselves with dialogue between and within contemporary societies. They also tend to create overtime collective choices organized in systems of thought for action (which Michel Foucault sums up under the expression "episteme"). Those systems constitute "stories", or even "histories" which are conversing along the centuries. Thus, there exist levels of temporality where intellectual oscillations, exchanges, cycles, can be observed in spite of the permanent direction of the time arrow. To be understood, these phenomena imply, that "thinking in circles" could be used in anthropology, instead of a linear deductive approach. For instance, great civilizations frequently build up the following recurring long term oppositions : autonomy and heteronomy of their components; or choice of governance strategy : gathering citizens around imaginary ideals or have them functionning along technical terms ? More complex models can emerge from a succession of cycles without doing away with oscillation. In general, historians hate the very notion of cycles, just like Fernand Braudel, and for just reasons. However, I believe that although a culture can be described as a conversation with its own past to give itself sense, we cannot ignore that a succession of contrary movements emerge like different positions emerge in a conversation with the Self. Late antiquity studied by Peter Brown shows the importance of philosophical maturation of the elites in the imperial choice for christianism. Closer to our days, periods of restauration follow revolutions and vice versa. And when we think that we have considered the question from all angles, bringing all necessary mediations, is it a coincidence that we have to move onto entirely new societal problematics (like the capacity of money to increase technological effects)? And later on, is it nonsensical to postulate that the bloodied comversation between authoritarian and liberal regimes being concluded to the benefice of the later, we then enter a new era centered around other questions (like environmental concerns) ? We can also place ourselves on other scales of temporality and discover how two simultaneous "vibrations" can develop themselves : for example, the "vibration" of conversational cycle set around social regulations crossing the 'vibration' of more traditional interests around the familiar world. Thus so called 'modern' concepts like the "Nation-State" could appear at the same time like a projection toward a future totalism, as well an attempt to repatriate it within a more familiar cultural and territorial proximity . Paradoxically enough, the tendency of a great number of historians to professionnally divide time in self-centered isolates is negating the phenomena of long term cultural experience. Therefore, it is all as if this tendency denied the very possibility of politics based on "wisdom" under the pretext that the conditions of a period drive men into practical sequences of which they have no control. To give a painful example, why an historian of genius like Hobsbawm remains deeply perplexed faced with a twentieth century torn between capitalism and warlike nationalism ? He refuses to envisage that the stake of global domination by technology was the dream of all global powers during that period. And that this dream of global power had only been curbed by mutual deterrence. However this dream -of total governance- is a political enunciation (even implicit) and is the only one to durably force back the possibility of the worse case scenario (which could spring out of any rift in the power struggle ). But at the same time it is quite unacceptable and is calling for the collective production of a counter enunciation , which is currently happening...
In other words, the contemporary history that we are fabricating is nothing more than a running conversation -not the postmodern adaptation of politics to technological demands -but a rather precosmopolitan one . It is likely that the historians of the future will have to consider the triggering character of the oil price in the important events of our era, but it would be irresponsible on their part not to consider that what has thus been triggered is most of all the constraint of reflecting together on the ways of life of humanity on the planet. Then again, if such a background of political problematics is valid for this period, why couldn't it be applied to a remote past even if the cultural conditions of the debate were passing through different ideological and cultural frameworks ? Can't we ask ourselves if the terms of today discussion are inherited from other systems of debate -mythological or religious-?
The 'historial' character (not only historical) of human societies must be brought closer to the question that Individuals ask themselves about their life and their inevitable death. Societies can believe themselves eternal but more and more they understand that they must not come any closer to certain limits. It is possible that the ecological problem represents the perspective of death and doomsday. In this sense, it "humanizes" a societal phenomenon caught in the cynical and machiavellian problematics of sovereign power, which have played a central role in international negociation and global design.
humanité :: L'humanité est l'un de ces mots "fourre-tout" qui peuvent servir de bannière aux pires exactions. Posée par exemple en opposition à "sous-humanité" ou à "sur-humanité", on sait où elle a entraîné. Mais aussi
"déshumaniser", "inhumain", ne sont pas sans effets incontrôlés, ambivalents. Assimilée à "espèce humaine", l'humanité nous voue sans doute à subir un jour la loi d'un humanisme scientiste. Prise pour une "société mondiale", la voila transformée en base d'une légitimité absolue, dont même l'Etat hégelien n'a jamais disposé, et dont on peut évidemment attendre le pire. Comment faire pour laisser ce mot disponible aux élans du coeur, sans pour autant en faire le moyen de la certitude que c'est toujours l''Autre qui risque de devenir non humain ? Or, en dépit de ce qu'affirment des philosophes bien intentionnés, même le pire bourreau demeure humain, ce qui permet d'ailleurs de le juger. En tout état de cause, la perspective d'intégration mondiale des cultures doit nous rendre extrêmement vigilants sur le non-recouvrement sémantique qui seul, permettra le maintien d'une pluralité essentielle aux êtres humains.
Voir aussi : Antagonisme, agonicité, Anthropologie, Pluralité, champ conversationnel, Anthropologie structurale, Versions (de l'homme)

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